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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
cot"( 
FILED IN OFFICE 
JAN 1 7 200715 
Deputy eleik Superior ~1Irt 
Fulton County, (l~!! 
MICROBILT CORPORATION, * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
-.------.=-~. --" 
Civil Action No. 2003-CY -79446 
(Business Division Two-EL) 
FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL INC., 
et al. 
Defendants, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
The above-styled case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motion to Reconsider and Clarification of Law. 
Defendants' Motion-mrSunnmn, JUtlgm6nt was originally considered by Judge Lane of 
the Fulton County Superior Court. Judge Lane issued an order for partial summalY judgment 
("Judge Lane's Order") on October 14, 2005. In response to the order, Defendants filed a Motion 
to Reconsider and Clarification of Law on November 16,2005_N'QIil.lifiWiIl'.'-ios __ f ___ ·IIiI __ IIIIi1·I_ 
November, 2006, when the case was transferred to the Business Case Division of Fulton County 
Superior Court and assigned to Judge Long. In light of the length oftime in which the motions 
had been pending, the unresolved issues of summary judgment, and the new assignment of the 
case, this Court held oral argument regarding all summary judgment issues and finds as follows: 
Plaintiff and Defendants' predecessor, Credit Data Reporting Services, Inc., ("CDRS") 
entered into a software licensing agreement in March, 1995, and executed a second agreement in 
May, 1995 (the "Contract"). Under the Contract, Plaintiff agreed to provide the software 
platfonn for the customers of a division of CDRS called the National Merging Center ("NMC") 
so that these cllstomers could access single and merged credit reports. References to CDRS and 
(J 
C) 
o 
NMC in the Contract have lead to disagreements as to whether or not the Contract encompasses 
the entire business ofCDRS orjust the business ofNMC. The Contract established a sliding 
pay-scale based upon the type of report and whether or not Plaintiff or another vendor was used 
to access the repOli. The parties disagree about the proper amount owed to Plaintiff under the 
Contract, the scope of the Contract, and the temlination of the Contract. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is "no genuine issue of material fact". 
O.e.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Stephens v. Gwinnett County, 
175 Ga. App. 379, 382 (1985). "The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of 
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and ifthe trial court is presented with a 
choice of inferences to be drawn from the facts, all inferences of fact from the proofs proffered at 
the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion." Id. 
During the oral argument before this Court on December 20, 2006, the parties presented 
arguments regarding the meaning of Section 1.2 of the Contract which was the subject of Judge 
Lane's Order. After this oral argument, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Briefin Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and Clarification of Law. In this brief Plaintiff contends that 
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, filed November 16, 2005, was filed after the end of the 
September-October court tenn during which Judge Lane's Order had been issued and therefore 
the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over Judge Lane's Order. 
Georgia case law restricts the authority of trial courts to modify, review, or revoke 
judgments to the tenn ofthe court in which the judgment is made. Cherry v. Moreton Rolleston, 
Jr. Living Trust, 273 Ga. App. 876, 879 (2005); Masters v. Clark, 269 Ga. App. 537, 539 (2004); 
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Bridgestonc/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Jenkins, 261 Ga. App. 20 (2003). Such restriction, 
however, is limited to final judgments or rulings. "The rule limiting the power of courts over 
their judgments to the tem1 at which they were rendered applies only to final judgments. An 
interlocutory decree does not pass out of control of the court with the end of the term." Union 
Circulation Co., Inc. v. Trust Co. Bank, 143 Ga. App. 715,717 (1977), rev'd on other grounds by 
241 Ga. 343 (1978), remanded to 146 Ga. App. 612 (1978) (remanding the case to the trial court 
to reevaluate the motion for partial summary judgment based on evidence that had not been 
considered); see also Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242 (1978). Similarly, in Wade 
v. Whalen, 232 Ga. App. 765, 769 (1998), the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment where another judge had previously denied summary judgment on 
the same issue in a previous term of court. Id. ("Summary judgment orders which do not dispose 
of the entire case are considered interlocutory and remain within the breast of the court until final 
judgment is entered."); see also Glover v. J.C. Penny Casualty Ins. Co., 181 Ga. App. 753, 754 
(1987) (holding that a partial summary judgment was interlocutory and subject to revision by the 
trial court at any time prior to final judgment). Accordingly, while this Court agrees with 
Plaintiff that final judgments may only be reconsidered on motions filed within the same term in 
which the judgment is made, Judge Lane's Order was an interlocutory order and thus the rule to 
which Plaintiff cites does not apply and the Court shall reconsider the all issues ruled upon in 
Judge Lane's Order. 
I. Secondary Vendor Fees 
The parties disagree as to the meaning of Section 1.2 of the Contract. Section 1.2 of the 
Contract reads: 
3 
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1.2 Access by Secondary Vendors. TTY delivery system access by the 
vendors, including but not limited to those listed below* and/or their 
subsidiaries, ("Secondary Vendors") will be allowed with payment by 
NMC to MicroBilt of three cents ($.03) per access to NMC. 
Key Communications, Inc. 
Data Rental & Sales 
LQue, Inc. (Smart.Alex Software) 
RJE, Inc. 
TCI, Inc. 
Profit Systems, Inc. 
Synergistic Software 
Digital Matrix Systems 
TL Data Systems 
New Albany, IN 
Van Nuys, CA 
Los Angeles, CA 
Sunnyvale, CA 
Long Island, NY 
P011land, OR 
Spokane, WA 
Dallas, TX 
Houston, TX 
* Any provider of TTY access systems active in the credit industry through 
December 3 I, 1997. 
Defendants contend that the meaning of the language provided by the asterisk limits the 
secondary vendor fees to be paid to Plaintiff for reports accessed through secondary vendors on 
or before December 31, 1997. On the other hand, Plaintiff contends that the Contract is an 
o exclusive provider contract and that Section 1.2 provides an exception to the exclusivity 
requirement. Plaintiff contends that Section 1.2 allows NMC to access credit reports through 
secondary vendors in exchange for a fee to be paid to Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the meaning 
of the inclusion of the date "December 31,1997" only acted to close the class of secondary 
vendors by which NMC could access the reports without violating the exclusivity terms of the 
Contract. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the provision is ambiguous and thus creates ajury 
question. 
Judge Lane's Order found the language of Section 1.2 to be unambiguous. Judge Lane 
held that the plain meaning ofthe asterisk and the date of December 31,1997, was a limitation 
on the class of secondary vendors whom Defendants could access without violating the 
4 () 
exclusivity requirement and by paying a fee to Plaintiff, not a limitation on the duration of the 
o provision. 
Construction of a contract is a three-step question of law for the courts to detemline. The 
first step oflhe analysis is 10 detennine whether the language of the contract is ambiguous or 
-'-, ,-. 
clear. Hokim (US), Inc., v. AMDG, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 818, 820 (2004). Ambiguity is defined 
as "duplicity, indistinctness, an uncertainty of meaning or expression used in a written 
instruction ... open to various interpretations." .!Q", citing Earlyv. Kent, 215 Ga. 49, 50(1) (1959). 
After careful consideration of Judge Lane's Order, the briefs submitted by both parties, 
and the arguments made by counsel, this Court finds the language of Section 1.2 of the Contract 
to be ambiguous. The placement ofthe phrase "through December 31,1997," makes the 
meaning of the section unclear. Had the sentence been structured or punctuated differently then 
one or the other party's interpretation might have been clear. The Contract as, written, ho~er, 
o simply has no plain meaning on its face. 
Once an ambiguity is found, the second step of contract construction is for the court to 
apply the rules of contract construction found in O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2. Hibbard v. P.G.A., Inc., 251 
Ga. App. 68 (2001). Section 13-2-2 establishes construction rules such as the role of parol or 
extrinsic evidence, how to interpret language, the preference for upholding the contract as a 
whole, and the presumption of interpretation against the drafting party. Additionally, section 13-
2-3 establishes the cardinal rule of contract construction which is to "ascertain the intention of 
the paliies". O.c.G.A. § 13-2-3. 
The evidence in the record establishes that Plaintiff drafted the Contract. Section 13-2-
2(5) states that a contract shall be construed "most strongly against the party executing the 
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instrument." Additionally, both parties presented deposition and affidavit testimony, but the 
o testimony is conflicting",._Accordin~sGIilur.t.llIIFe~niesDefendants' request for summary 
judgment relating to the meaning of Section 1.2 of the Contract and finds that this question 
should be submitted to the jUly. 
In connection with the parties' arguments regarding Section 1.2, Defendants contend that 
Plaintiffs interpretation of the provision renders it an unenforceable covenant under O.e.G.A. § 
13-8-2(a)(2) because it contained no time or geographical limitations upon the restriction. The 
secondary vendor fee was tied to the exclusivity tern1S ofthe Contract. Plaintiff argued that the 
ten11S of the Contract are analogous to those of a supply agreement, which are enforceable. This 
COUli agrees. Regardless of the ultimate detennination of the meaning of the Section 1.2, neither 
the interpretation proffered by Plaintiff nor the Defendants renders the provision an 
unenforceable restrictive covenant. 
.~-- - --- "::: ._ .... _""L 
o II. Controlling Agreement 
Defendants contend that the version ofthe Contract executed in March, 1995, is the valid 
agreement because the second version signed in May, 1995, has no additional consideration to 
support it. This Court finds, as did Judge Lane, that the continuing mutual obligations constitute 
sufficient consideration to modify an existing, executory agreement. J.R. Mitchell & Son v. La 
Fayette Inv. Realty Co., 30 Ga. App. 696 (1923). Thus the May agreement is the Contract that 
governs the parties' legal obligations. 
III. Termination Date 
There is no dispute that CDRS wrote Plaintiff in a letter dated June 27, 2002, a notice of 
tennination of the Contract at the end of the current tenn. Section 10 of the Contract required 
(J 6 
. notice oftem1ination at least ninety days prior to the end of the term. The record is clear and 
o undisputed that Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter and failed to object to the fact that the 
notice was delivered via regular, not certified, mail as required in the Contract. As such, Plaintiff 
waived the non-confom1ing notice and is now barred from raising the fom1 of delivery as failure 
_ u __ 
to provide adequate notice oftelmination. See Goldman v. Vinson, 244 Ga. App. 815 (2000). 
This COllli hereby finds, as did Judge Lane, that Defendants' June 27,2002, letter constituted 
sufficient notice of termination of the Contract. 
Clerical mistakes or non-substantive errors in judgments and orders may be corrected by 
any court at any time. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g); see also Cherry v. Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living 
Tmst, 273 Ga. App. 876, 879 (2005). Judge Lane's Order set March 20, 2003, as the 
tem1ination date for the Contract although the current term of the Contract would have ended on 
May 9, 2003. Additionally, the parties are in agreement that if the May, 1995, Contract govems 
o the relationship and ifCDRS's June 27,2002, letter was sufficient notice oftermination, then the 
termination date of the Contract was May 9,2003. Misstating the termination date to be March 
20th is a clerical error within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g). Cherry, 273 Ga. App. 876. 
This Court hereby finds that the termination date ofthe Contract was May 9, 2003. 
IV. Scope of the Agreement 
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree as to the scope of the Contract and whether or not it 
encompassed credit reports as a part ofCDRS's retail business, reports obtained through 
Plaintiffs Intemet-hosted software site, or reports accessed via a direct CPU-to-CPU cOID1ection. 
A. Wholesale/Retail Distinction: 
Plaintiff contends that the Contract is between CDRS and Plaintiff and therefore applies 
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to all credit reports accessed by CDRS, not just those accessed by NMC. In interpreting the 
o Contract the introductory paragraph of the Contract identifies CDRS as a party and then states 
that it is doing business as NMC. The only other reference to CDRS within the Contract is on 
the signature line. Every other reference within the Contract is to NMC only. Thus the Court 
finds the language to be ambiguous and must look to the mles of contract constmction found in 
O.CG.A. § 13-2-2 to reconcile the ambiguities. Id. 
Reviewing the contract as a whole and adopting the interpretation that upholds the entire 
contract and renders no portion of the contract language meaningless is required under O.C.G.A. 
§ 13-2-2(4). See RLI Ins. Co. v. Highlands on Ponce, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 798 (2006); White v. 
Kaminsky, 271 Ga. App. 719,722 (2005) (stating that a "contract must be interpreted to give the 
greatest effect possible to all provisions rather than to leave any part of the contract unreasonable 
or having no effect"). In viewing the Contract as whole, it is clear that the Contract obligations 
C) and rights are placed on NMC only and that the Contract applies to the reports accessed through 
NMC only. Additionally, to find otherwise would render the thirty-two references to NMC 
<=. within the·Gontraet-meMHllgl •• n: ;Phis Court finds that the Contract applies only to those credit 
reports accessed through NMC. 
B, Internet Accessed Credit Reports: 
As stated above, contract construction is a question oflaw initially left to the court to 
detennine. Section 1.3 of the Contract clearly establishes an obligation upon NMC to pay 
Plaintiff"per Merged Credit Report accessed via any Credit Verification Product. ... " Credit 
Verification Products are defined as "certain proprietary computer software and hardware 
products now or hereafter used to access credit verification reports .... " The Court agrees with 
r::J 8 
o 
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Plaintiff that the Contract defines Credit Verification Products as the original software/hardware 
as well as future developments of such software/hardware. Such definition could include an 
internet-hosted version of Plaintiffs original software if that was the intent ofthe parties. 
Whether or not the parties intended the Contract to include credit reports accessed via the 
Internet is a question for the jury. 
C. CPU-to-CPU Connections: 
Under the Contract, Plaintiff was obligated to provide NMC access to various computer 
software and hardware products ("Credit Verification Products") used to access credit 
verification reports in exchange for primary vendor status and fees paid by NMC. The Contract 
establishes the scope of the Contract and limits it to credit reports accessed via Plaintiffs Credit 
Verification Products. The question is whether or not a CPU-to-CPU connection is within the 
scope of the definition of Credit Verification Products under the Contract. The Contract does not 
o answer this question, nor do the rules of construction. This also is a question for the jury to 
o 
detefll1ine. 
V. Defendant Recoupment Claims 
Defendants allege that NMC erroneously paid Plaintiff over $70,000 for credit reports 
outside of the scope of the Contract and seek to deduct the $70,000 overpayment from any 
damages proved by Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that such recoupment and setoff claims are 
compulsory counterclaims and had to be raised in Defendants' original answer. 
O.C.G.A. §§ 13-7-2 and 3 define recoupment as the right ofa defendant to have a 
deduction fi'OlTI a plaintiffs damages from claims arising from the same transaction. O.e.G.A. § 
13-7-12 states that recoupment "lies for overpayment by the defendant .... " Recoupment and 
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setoff claims are traditionally treated as counterclaims if they assert a defendant's affirmative 
right to payment. Such categorization of recoupment and setoff as counterclaims, however, is 
neither absolute nor deternlinative of the claim. For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
citing Moore's Federal Practice when discussing whether a recoupment claim was properly 
categorized as a counterclaim or a defense said "when a party has mistakenly designated a 
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." Gwinnett 
Commercial Bank v. Flake, 151 Ga. App. 578, 580 {I 979). Ultimately the court found no 
distinction or error in the treatment of a recoupment/setoff defense as a counterclaim. rd. 
Defendants asserted recoupment and setoff as its ninth defense in its originally filed 
answer. Thus, Plaintiffs argument that such claims are improper because not raised in 
Defendants' original answer is without basis. Additionally, because the categorization of the 
o claim as either a defense or a counterclaim is not determinative of its treatment by the court, there 
is no reason why Defendants should be precluded from raising the alleged overpayment on the 
issue of damages. 
o 
To recap, this Court hereby finds that the May, 1995, Contract governs the parties' legal 
obligations and that the Contract was terminated, effective May 9, 2003. Additionally, this Court 
finds that the Contract applies to credit reports accessed by NMC only. This Court also finds the 
meaning of Section 1.2 of the Contract to be ambiguous and thus reserves it as a question for the 
jury along with questions of whether the Contract applies to internet-accessed and CPU-to-CPU 
10 
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credit reports. Finally, NMC's overpayment may be deducted from any damages owed to 
Plaintiff. 
t:A 
SO ORDERED this 17 day of January, 2007. 
Copies to: 
Kevin Harrison Hudson, Esq. 
Mary Lilliall'Walker, Esq. 
Foltz Mm1in LLC 
3525 Piedmont Road NE 
Five Piedmont Center 
Suite 750 
Atlanta, GA 30305-1541 
David L. Pardue, Esq. 
Alycia K. Jastrebski, Esq. 
Hm1man, Simons, Spielman & Wood LLP 
6400 Powers Ferry Road NW 
Suite 400 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
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